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Abstract: 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of behavioral factors and war on decision making under 
political conflict. We consider the impact of irrational factors (overconfidence, optimism, pessimism), and war 
on decision making in such unique case. Investigating the period 2008 to 2016, covering 2,185 stock-day 
observations, we find that all factors, excluding overconfidence, experience a significant impact on decision 
making. More specifically, optimism significantly increases the volume of trade (as a proxy for decision 
making), whereas, pessimism and war have significant adverse effects on the variation of financial markets 
under political conflict.  
Keywords: Decision making; overconfidence; optimism; pessimism; war; political conflict. 
1. Introduction 
Traditional finance assumes that financial markets, including individuals and institutions, are rational, meaning 
that they make unbiased decisions to maximize their utility (Baker, & Nofsinger, 2010). According to the 
efficient securities market theory, the prices of securities in financial markets reflect all available information 
that is publicly known. It suggests that investors will react quickly to new information. However, the hypothesis 
of the efficient securities market theory has been examined, and various pieces of evidence suggest that financial 
markets may not be as efficient as originally believed, implying that investors are likely irrational (Scott, 2009). 
In both developed and emerging countries, the hypotheses of efficient markets and the concept of rational 
expectation have failed to justify trade returns and volume patterns (Dhaoui, 2015). This has resulted in limited 
reliance on the information derived from the market structure. 
It is necessary to suggest new factors to explain the conduct of capital markets. In this respect, behavioral 
finance offers some clarity regarding individuals’ decisions choices (Oprean, 2014). Though a relatively new 
perspective on the pattern of finance, behavioral finance tries to explain individuals’ economic decisions, beyond 
the traditional theories of securities markets, by combining behavioral and cognitive psychological theory with 
traditional economic and finance theories. The key to this school of thought is that information structures and 
market-outcomes are not the only factors to impact investment decision making. It adds the characteristics of 
market participants as factors that systematically play an important role in investment decision-making process 
(Baker, & Nofsinger, 2010).  
Most finance studies focus on developed markets, with very little consideration for the application on pre-
emerging markets (Luong, & Ha, 2011). More importantly, according to the authors, financial markets operating 
under political conflict are not considered as in the more developed and other developing countries. Financial 
markets under situations of political turmoil are unique and rare cases of investigation. An adequate example is 
the Palestine Exchange (PEX), which operates despite the brinkmanship between Palestine and Israel, and the 
occurrences of many wars1.   
Established in 1995, PEX is considered as the first and only financial market in Palestine. Moreover, it is the first 
and only fully-automated financial exchange in the Arab world that is publicly traded; and fully owned by the 
private sector. As of October 2017, PEX housed 48 listed companies with a market capitalization of 
                                                          
1The first war, after opining Palestine exchange (PEX), was started from 27-12-2008 to 18-01-2009. The second was started 
from 14-11-2012 to 21-11-2012. The third was started from 80-07-2014 to 26-08-2014. 
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approximately USD $3.8 trillion. The main economic sectors in the PEX are banking and financial 
services, insurance, investments, industry, and services.1 
This study is important because it can help investors who seek a better understanding of investment in financial 
markets in the presence of political conflict before making their decisions, leading to better strategic decision-
making. Further, it provides insight into future financial market trend due to the role of behavioral factors and 
war within similar financial markets. Therefore the results of this paper can benefit the investment decision 
making as well as the regulation of financial markets working under political conflict. 
The present study is expected to extend the literature in finance studies as it deals with a rare case of financial 
markets that operate under political conflict and have a special situation which is not commonly found in other 
normal financial markets in the world. By applying this study on PEX, the best example of pre-emerging markets 
that works under political conflict, the authors try to investigate the impact of behavioral factors 
(overconfidence, optimism, pessimism), and war on decision making under political conflict. 
The rest of this paper as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the data, followed by the study’s design in section 4. Section 5 discusses the findings. Additional 
robustness tests are addressed in section 6. The final section presents a brief conclusion. 
2. Review of literature and hypotheses developments 
2.1. Overconfidence 
Overconfidence seems to be a general behave of human reaction. Extra confidence makes individuals feel good 
and moves them to do things they might not otherwise have done. Possibly, it may lead them to irrational 
decisions (Baker, & Nofsinger, 2010). Psychological theory suggests that persons overestimate the precision of 
information they collect themselves. Therefore, overconfident investors will underreact to new information that 
is not collected by themselves (Scott, 2009). Additionally, overconfident investors are often too confident about 
their judgments (Pompian, 2006). Further, overconfidence plays a critical role in managerial acquisition decision 
(Billett, & Qian, 2008). On the other hand, a stream of research about market efficiency investigates whether 
price changes could be forecasted using past returns (Lewellen, 2004). In this regard, confident investors 
increase the volume of their transactions when returns go up. They overestimate their judgment capabilities and 
undervalue the risk. Hence they act persistently and, as a result, the volume of trade will be increased. More 
specifically, if the returns of a given security on previous day, , are positive, the overconfident investor is 
expected to react quickly in the present day and then heavy transaction is expected in that day, but if the returns 
of a given security on previous day are negative, the overconfident investor is not expected to trade in the present 
day. Accordingly, the behavior of overconfidence can be described as in equation (1) (Oprean, 2014; Oprean, & 
Tanasescu, 2014).  
:  ≥ 0 → ℎ    
   :  < 0 → ℎ     
(1) 
Clearly, the behaviour of overconfidence is positively associated with volume of trade (as a proxy of decision 
making). Therefore, we state our first hypothesis in the alternative form with positive direction as follows: 
H1: Overconfidence has a positive impact on trading volume.   
2.2. Optimism 
Optimism bias is inconsistent with the independence of decision weights and payoffs found in models of choice, 
which works under uncertainty and risk; i.e. expected utility theory, subjective expected utility, and prospect 
theory (Bracha, & Brown, 2012). The psychology literature documents an extensive tendency in all individuals 
to be optimistic on the subject of their abilities and their future. Additionally, developing literature in economics 
and finance confirms that biases of optimism extend to organizations' senior executives and CEOs and have an 
economically significant effect on corporate decisions, activities, and consequences (Otto, 2014). Optimism can 
be defined as positive expectations about future events. However, it is different from “overconfidence” about 
skills or estimations (Jacobsen, Lee, Marquering, & Zhang, 2014). Collecting data from more than 1000 
entrepreneurs in Kenya, Burundi, and Indonesia, Wood, Bradley, & Artz (2015) investigate the impact of 
optimism on entrepreneurial outcomes. Their results support the notion that optimism plays an important role in 
                                                          
1 These information are obtained from the website of PEX: 
http://www.pex.ps/PSEWebSite/English/AboutPSE.aspx?TabIndex=0 
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business growth. The study by Jarboui, Forget, & Boujelbene (2014) provide strong evidence of the negative 
influence of CEOs’ optimism bias on transport firms’ technical efficiency, concluding that managerial optimism 
reduces transport firms’ technical efficiency. Creating a novel measure of optimism, the findings of Puri, & 
Robinson (2007) suggest a positive relationship between optimism positive beliefs about future economic 
circumstances and with psychometric tests of optimism. Furthermore, they demonstrate that optimism is 
connected with many work/life choices: more optimistic persons work harder, invest more in individual stocks, 
and save more. However, they argue that moderate optimists show rational financial behaviour, though extreme 
optimists show financial behaviour that is not prudent. Jacobsen, et al. (2014) explore gender differences in 
optimism and asset allocation. They address that women tend to be considerably less optimistic than men. Their 
findings are not limited to economic or financial aspects. According to their results, men are more optimistic 
than women in several other aspects of life as well. In the opinion of Dhaoui (2015), optimism occurs when, on 
the previous day, investors reach a certain set degree of earnings, and then investors aggressively increase the 
volume of their transactions. On the other hand, if the obtained returns are lower than that degree of returns, 
investors' behaviour is expected to be normal or they might decide to delay trading. The minimum degree of 
return that might cause optimism depends on the value of summation of the average returns and its standard 
deviation that calculated over the entire period under consideration,  +  . Hence, optimistic investors are 
expected to trade aggressively when the returns of the preceding day, , are equal to or greater than that 
degree. Otherwise, they will reject trading. Accordingly, the behavior of optimism can be described as in 
equation (2) (Oprean, 2014; Oprean, & Tanasescu, 2014). 
:  ≥  +  → ℎ    
     :  <  +  → ℎ     
(2) 
Apparently, the phenomenon of optimism is positively associated with decision making, which in turn it is 
expected to increase the volume of trade when it is the case. Therefore, we state our second hypothesis in the 
alternative form with a positive direction. 
H2: Optimism has a positive impact on trading volume.  
2.3. Pessimism 
Conlin et al. (2015) study the association between personality characters and financial market participation. They 
claim that the traits to be substantial predictors of financial market participation. In particular, exploratory 
moodiness, extravagance, romanticism, and dependency have huge effects. As noted by Dhaoui, & Khraief 
(2014), investor’s emotion plays a significant role in explaining the trading intensity and market trend variations. 
Their results reveal that pessimistic emotion has a significant impact on French financial market trend. 
Furthermore, they suggest that the effect of pessimism on asset returns exceeds that of optimism as a direct 
indicator of investor’s opinions. More specifically, indirect indicators of agent emotion represent more smoothed 
effects on these two market components. Their results show that incorporating psychological elements in macro-
financial models leads to better regulation and control of the key drivers of the markets. An analysis of the 
expectations in a unique environment is given by Dickinson, & Oxoby (2011). They point out that behaviorally 
and economically important spillover effects (e.g., pessimism regarding one’s initial conditions) might have 
spillover effects on individual’s future labour market outcomes. Pessimism occurs when investors obtain losses 
on the preceding day, which in turn pessimistic investors tend to decrease their trading volume or get out from 
trading when their losses reach a certain set degree of return. But when they achieve better results than that 
degree, their reaction is expected to be normal (Oprean, 2014; Oprean, & Tanasescu, 2014). The minimum loss 
degree which caused by pessimists is equal the average returns minus its standard deviation computed over the 
whole period under investigation,  − . Therefore, when pessimistic investors' losses in the prior period, , 
is greater than that computed value, they will not trade, but if their losses are less than the said value, they will 
continue in trading. Accordingly, the behavior of Pessimism can be described as in equation (3) (Dhaoui, 2015).  
:  >  −  → ℎ    
:  ≤  −  → ℎ     
(3) 
In close, investors with pessimistic emotion play a negative role in the financial market and their behaviour tends 
to decrease the trading volume when they achieve results less than the level they target it. Thus, we put our third 
hypothesis in the alternative form with negative direction as follows: 
H3: Pessimism has a negative impact on trading volume.   
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Many studies investigate the impact of war on financial markets around the world. The study by Rigobon, & 
Sack (2005) analyze the risk associated with the war in Iraq on various US financial variables. They find that the 
risk of war in Iraq has a significant influence on many US financial variables. They conclude that the increases 
in war risk cause a fall in the yields of treasury and equity prices, an increase in oil prices, a widening of 
corporate yield spreads, and a drop in the value of US currency. Using a sample period from January 2000 to 
June 2006, Fernandez (2008) studies how the influence of the political instability in the Middle East, after the 
invasion of Iraq, on the financial markets volatility around the world. They find that political instability in the 
Middle East has the greatest influence on the volatility of financial markets around the beginning of war on Iraq, 
and also developed financial markets are affected as well. Examining the consequence of World War Two 
(WWII) on the British stock market, Hudson, & Urquhart (2015) fail to find strong and significant links between 
war events and market returns, although their results support the negativity effect of war on between them. Using 
the top 30 companies by market capitalization listed on Colombo Stock Exchange over the period 1998 to 2003, 
Abeysekera (2011) investigates the influence of current-period intellectual capital disclosure on earnings and 
current annual stock return during a civil-war period in Sri Lanka. He finds that companies do not include the 
current period intellectual capital disclosure in the current stock return. Moreover, he notes that the increase in 
the current-period intellectual capital disclosure practice does not influence earnings included in the current 
stock return. However, his findings provide insights into the intellectual capital disclosure activity and its impact 
on stock return in a civil-war environment. The study by Amihud, & Wohl (2004) explore the association 
between the expectations of Saddam Hussein’s fall from power and stock prices, exchange rates, and oil prices. 
They discover that, during the war, an increase in the probability of Saddam’s fall, which also reveals a speedy 
end to the war, is positively and significantly related with share prices, reinforced the dollar and a drop in oil 
prices. Moreover, they suggest that the higher probability of Saddam’s fall, prior to the war, would have led to a 
fall in stock prices.  
In summary, the prior debate support the view that war is expected to have a negative impact on financial market 
decision making. Hence, we put the final hypothesis in the alternative form with negative direction as follows: 
H4: War has a negative impact on trading volume.   
3. Data 
The population of the current study includes all investors in PEX. The collected data covers the period from 
2008 to 2016. We collect data on trading volume manually from the website of Palestine Exchange1 and data on 
closing price, to compute the market returns, is obtained from the website of Investing.com2. Following the 
elimination of records with missing data, the sample totalled 2185 stock-day observations. Table 1 provides 
some descriptive statistics about the data. 
As shown in Table 1, the number of all observations is 2185 observations. The minimum value of volume is 
approximately 10.2, a maximum of 17.4, and an average value of 13.1. Overconfidence shows a minimum value 
of -0.00897, and a maximum value of 0.009091. The mean value of optimism variable stood at 0.001405, a 
minimum of zero and a maximum value is 0.085514. Pessimism variable has a mean value of -0.00121, a 
minimum of -0.08337, and a high of zero. The mean vale of war variable is about 0.012821, a low of zero, and a 
high of 1. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Trading (Log of volume) 2185 13.12722 0.918223 10.23538 17.44358 
Overconfidence 2185 -0.00015 0.003543 -0.00897 0.009091 
Optimism 2185 0.001405 0.00569 0 0.085514 
Pessimism 2185 -0.00121 0.005807 -0.08337 0 
War 2185 0.012821 0.112525 0 1 
Notes: This table summarizes some descriptive statistics of the study variables. 
                                                          
1
 www.pex.ps.  
2
 https://www.investing.com/indices/ple-historical-data. 
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4. Study design 
The authors use the following model described in equation (4) to examine the influence of behavioral factors and 
war on decision making under political conflict. 
  ! = #$ + # %& + #'%(!! +  #)*!! + #'+ +  (4) 
where   ! represents the natural logarithm of the trading volume in time0. %&  represents 
the returns expected by overconfident investors in time0  considering the returns they realize in time0 . The 
proxy of overconfidence takes the value of   providing that 1 − 2 <  < 1 + 2 ,1 where   is the 
average of return and σ is its standard deviation for the whole period under investigation. %(!! represents 
the returns expected by optimistic investors in time0 considering the return they realize in time0. The proxy of 
optimism takes the value of  when  ≥ 1 + 2, and zero otherwise.  *!! represents the returns 
expected by pessimistic investors in time0  considering the return they realize in time0 . The proxy of 
pessimism takes the value of  when  ≤ 1 − 2, and zero otherwise. War0 represents the presence of 
war in time0, which equals one when the war is the case,2 and zero otherwise.  represents the error term in 
time0 . 
The impact of an independent variable on decision making in financial markets under political conflict is 
captured by its coefficient, #. A significantly negative (positive) value of # reveals that the related independent 
variable with that # decreases (increases) the trading volume in such markets, which implies a significant impact 
on decision making under political conflict.  
5. Results 
Using the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test, we start by testing the stationary of dependent and independent 
variables. The null hypothesis for this test states that the tested variable contains a unit root, indicating that the 
said variable is not stationary. The outcomes of ADF test are presented in Table 2. 
Results in Table 2 show that all variables are stationary since t-statistic for each variable is significant at less 
than 1%. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis that each variable contains a unit root and continue to 
estimate our regression. We also test several assumptions related to the classical linear regression model, namely 
assumption of no perfect multicollinearity between the independent variables, homoscedasticity assumption of 
the disturbance terms, no autocorrelation and normality assumption of the disturbance term. In order to mitigate 
homoscedasticity and autocorrelation, standard errors are adjusted using the Newey–West procedure (HAC 
method).3     
Table 2: ADF test for stationary 
Variables t-statistic p-value 
Trading volume -20.164*** 0.0000 
Overconfidence -32.455*** 0.0000 
Optimism -27.564*** 0.0000 
Pessimism -25.245*** 0.0000 
War -11.517*** 0.0000 
Notes: This table summarizes the outcomes of ADF test of the stationary of dependent and independent variables.. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
                                                          
1
 The greater value of 89within this interval, from 1 − 2 to 1 + 2, the greater degree of overconfidence, and vice 
versa. If 89 is equal or exceeds 1 + 2 the return will be positively abnormal and this situation generates the emotions of 
optimism. On the other hand, if  is equal to or less than 1 − 2 the return will be negatively abnormal and this situation 
generates the emotions of pessimism. 
2
 The periods of war are three. First: from 27-12-2008 to 18-1-2009. Second: from 14-11-2012 to 21-11-2012. Third: from 8-
7-2014 to 26-8-2014.   
3
 In large samples, one can use the Newey–West procedure (HAC method) to correct OLS standard errors not only in cases of 
autocorrelation problem but also in situations of heteroscedasticity, for the HAC method can handle both problems, unlike 
the White method, which was designed specifically for heteroscedasticity problem (Gujarati, 2004). 
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Table 3 shows the main results of our regressions. At the first place, our results exhibit that trading volume is 
greatly and positively affected by optimistic behaviour when the return in the previous day becomes positively 
abnormal, as optimism emotions have the greatest positive and significant coefficient, 32.287. In this regard, 
investors react positively following profit made. Their extreme reaction leads to a significant increase in the 
volume of securities traded in financial markets. Whereas, the coefficient of pessimism is significantly negative, 
-11.502, suggesting that pessimism significantly decreases the volume of trading when the return in the previous 
day becomes negatively abnormal. Regarding the overconfidence phenomenon, it looks like that this behaviour 
is positive associated with trading volume but without any statistical significance since its t-statistic is about 
0.850. Finally, war has a significant and negative impact on trading, suggesting that investors significantly 
decrease their sharing in trading under war.  
Table 3: Regression summary 
Trading volume Expected signs Coefficients. t-statistic P-value 
Overconfidence + 4.727 0.850 0.198 
Optimism + 32.287*** 7.310 0.000 
Pessimism - -11.502*** -3.870 0.000 
War - -0.879*** -8.030 0.000 
Constant ? 13.080*** 557.450 0.000 
Observations 2185    
F-statistic 27.08***    
R-squared 0.0522    
Notes: This table summarizes the estimated results to test the impact of behavioral factors and war on decision making under 
political conflict. The OLS standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and first-order order autocorrelation using the 
Newey–West procedure. The reported p-values are based on two-tailed significance levels and on one-tailed levels when the 
prediction is directional.  *, **, *** indicates statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
6. Robustness tests 
6.1. Results using narrower time windows 
The current study includes years from 2008 to 2016 (9 years). In order to reduce the likelihood of other factors 
confounding our results, we reestimate the main model over 7 narrower time windows (2008-2009, 2008-2010, 
2008-2011, 2008-2012, 2008-2013, 2008-2014, 2008-2015). Almost, the obtained results are qualitatively 
similar in all columns. Although pessimism factor is not significant in column (1) for the period from 2008-2009, 
it can be noted that pessimism variable has negative impact as we predict, see Table 4.  
Table 4: Results using narrower time windows 
Trading Expected (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
volume signs T08_09 T08_10 T08_11 T08_12 T08_13 T08_14 T08_15 
Overconfidence + 2.7 2.6 0.2 3.0 3.8 5.9 6.8 
 
 (0.401) (0.382) (0.491) (0.336) (0.278) (0.165) (0.119) 
Optimism + 18.1*** 20.1*** 23.2*** 26.6*** 29.9*** 30.3*** 32.3*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pessimism - -2.7 -5.7** -7.3*** -9.8*** -10.3*** -10.6*** -12.0*** 
 
 (0.187) (0.033) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
War - -0.9*** -0.9*** -0.8*** -0.9*** -0.9*** -0.9*** -0.9*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant ? 13.5*** 13.4*** 13.3*** 13.2*** 13.2*** 13.1*** 13.1*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  481 728 974 1221 1462 1703 1946 
Adj. R2  0.0547 0.0496 0.0498 0.0556 0.0586 0.0618 0.0574 
F-statistic  6.96*** 7.95*** 9.33*** 14.27*** 15.26*** 27.16*** 27.35*** 
Prob > F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: As a robustness test, this table shows the estimated results, using narrower time windows, to test the impact of 
behavioral factors and war on decision making under political conflict. The narrower time windows include 7 different 
periods (2008-2009, 2008-2010, 2008-2011, 2008-2012, 2008-2013, 2008-2014 and 2008-2015). The OLS standard errors 
are corrected for heteroscedasticity and first-order order autocorrelation using the Newey–West procedure (HAC method). 
The reported p-values are based on two-tailed significance levels and on one-tailed levels when the prediction is directional.  
*, **, *** indicates statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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6.2. Results calculating  +  and  −   based on past period 
In the construction of optimism, pessimism variables, the authors rely on past and future knowledge in order to 
construct the said variables. For example, The current paper assumes that optimistic investors are expected to 
trade aggressively when the returns of the past day, 89, are equal or higher than the summation of the average 
returns and standard deviation,  + , that calculated over the entire period. However, when taking the decision 
one cannot know the future, only the past. Therefore, the authors compare 89  with  +   and  −   that 
calculated over past period (2008-2015), see column (8) of Table 5. At the same time, we redo this procedure 
using 7 past periods (2008-2009, 2008-2010, 2008-2011, 2008-2012, 2008-2013, 2008-2014, 2008-2015) to 
control for the likelihood of other factors confounding our results, see columns from (1) to (7) of Table 5. More 
specifically, we rerun our main model over 8 different time windows (2008-2009, 2008-2010, 2008-2011, 2008-
2012, 2008-2013, 2008-2014, 2008-2015 and 2008-2016), where  +  and  −  are calculated over the whole 
past period for every estimation. For example, column (1) in Table 5 represents the estimation results for the 
period from 2008 to 2009, calculating  +  and  −  based on the past period (2008); column (2) represents 
the estimation results for the period from 2008 to 2010, calculating  +  and  −  based on the past period 
(from 2008 to 2009), etc. As shown in column (8) of Table 5, the estimated results are unaffected. Almost, the 
rest columns show the same results confirming that our results are not affected by other factors. Although 
pessimism factor is not significant in column (1) and (2), it can be seen that pessimism variable is still negative 
as predicted.  
Table 5: Results calculating  +  and  −   based on past period 
Trading Expected (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
volume signs T08_09 T08_10 T08_11 T08_12 T08_13 T08_14 T08_15 T08_16 
Overconfidence + 4.4 3.4 2.9 2.8 2.2 5.8 6.8 5.8 
 
 (0.210) (0.257) (0.279) (0.314) (0.348) (0.141) (0.105) (0.143) 
Optimism + 16.5*** 19.4*** 22.7*** 26.1*** 29.8*** 29.7*** 31.9*** 31.7*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pessimism - -0.4 -3.6 -6.3** -8.4*** -8.8*** -9.6*** -11.2*** -11.1*** 
 
 (0.452) (0.120) (0.022) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
War - -0.8*** -0.8*** -0.8*** -0.9*** -0.9*** -0.9*** -0.9*** -0.9*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant ? 13.5*** 13.4*** 13.3*** 13.2*** 13.2*** 13.1*** 13.1*** 13.1*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  481 728 974 1221 1462 1703 1946 2183 
Adj. R2  0.0459 0.0427 0.0455 0.0511 0.0551 0.0584 0.0549 0.0487 
F-statistic  7.09*** 7.67*** 9.00*** 13.78*** 14.31*** 26.24*** 26.53*** 26.66*** 
Prob > F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: As a robustness test, this table shows the estimated results, calculating  +  and  −   based on past period, to test 
the impact of behavioral factors and war on decision making under political conflict. The different time windows include 8 
different periods (2008-2009, 2008-2010, 2008-2011, 2008-2012, 2008-2013, 2008-2014, 2008-2015 and 2008-2016). The 
OLS standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and first-order order autocorrelation using the Newey–West procedure 
(HAC method). The reported p-values are based on two-tailed significance levels and on one-tailed levels when the prediction 
is directional.  *, **, *** indicates statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
7. Conclusion 
The current study aims to investigate the role of overconfidence, optimism, pessimism, and war on decision 
making in Palestine, where political conflict is present. The results of this study show that, under political 
conflict, optimism and pessimism are the suitable factors to explain the variation in trading when the return 
becomes abnormal, meaning that investors behave irrationally under such unusual environment. Consistent with 
Amihud and Wohl (2004), Rigobon and Sack (2005), and Hudson and Urquhart (2015), our study confirms the 
negative impact of war on decision making. In addition, war and pessimism represent the case of risk aversion 
since investors react negatively under war and when the return becomes negatively not normal. This study can 
help investors who seek a better understanding of investment in such financial markets before making their 
decisions. It implicates that, under war and pessimism, the volume of trade is expected to be reduced 
significantly. Therefore, we recommend investors to avoid trading during these conditions. On the contrary, 
investors are strongly recommended to trade when situations become more optimistic. In other words, our 
findings emphasize that investors must take into account war and the feeling of others decision makers as 
fundamental factors having influence on the market behavior under political conflict. Further, our findings 
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indicate that regulation body shall keep an eye on the role of behavioral factors and war on financial markets 
under political conflict in order to guarantee better supervision and control the main drivers of such financial 
markets. The present study is expected to extend the literature of behavioral finance as it support the notion that 
behavioral biases can play a considerable role in determining the decision-making strategies on one hand, and as 
it deals with a rare case of financial markets that operate under political conflict and have a special situation 
which is not commonly found in other normal financial markets in the world on the other hand.  One limit of this 
study is that other behavioral factors (e.g., loss aversion, herding effect, and representativeness) are not 
considered in the current study. Another limitation is that our model only includes behavioral variables and war 
ignoring other explanatory variables that may have impact on trading volume. However, these limitations can be 
investigated in future research. In addition, the authors also recommend investigating the contribution of 
behavioral factors to explain the variation in trading volume in other countries suffering from instability. 
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